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Before becoming the second female to sit on the United States Supreme Court, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg established herself as a fighter in the face of adversity. She lost her mother at an 
early age, was one of nine females in her law school class and was rejected from countless law 
firms and clerkships as a young attorney on account of gender. Despite this, Ginsburg developed 
a renowned legal career as an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). There, 
she argued gender equality cases in front of the Supreme Court and her work was influential in 
persuading the Court to raise the standard of review for gender-based classifications to 
intermediate scrutiny. 
In 1980, President Carter appointed Ginsburg to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. In 1992, just one year before being nominated to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg 
delivered a lecture in which she identified two dominant themes in her jurisprudential approach. 
The first, collegiality in decision-making, emphasized the importance of collegial relationships 
between members of the Court, specifically as it applied to opinion writing. The second, 
measured motions, stressed judicial restraint and the use of stare decisis as a means of restricting 
judges from letting personal views distract from impartial decision-making. Ginsburg's view 
that the Constitution is a living document has also influenced her jurisprudential approach, 
particularly as it colors her perspective of fair treatment under the law. 
In her twenty years on the court, Ginsburg has remained largely consistent in adjudicating 
cases narrowly and has adhered to the view that the Constitution is a living document. However, 
in recent years her stance on collegiality towards her colleagues seems to be shifting, leaving 
many wondering if Ginsburg has finally found her voice. This change likely arises from two 
parallel factors. The first, is the departure of Justice John Paul Stevens from the Court in 2010. 
For the majority of Ginsburg's tenure on the Court, Stevens was the senior most liberal Justice 
2 
and was responsible for assigning authorship of decisions, particularly those that fell along party 
lines. As a result, Stevens often wrote many of the blockbuster decisions on behalf of the liberal 
block of the Court. With his departure, Ginsburg inherited this role. As Ginsburg selects the 
opinions she wishes to author, we may be seeing a new voice emerge in a way that was not 
possible in prior terms. The second factor is Ginsburg's view that this Court is on track to 
become one of the most activist in recent history, if measured by the willingness to overturn 
legislation enacted by Congress. Because judicial activism stands in direct opposition to 
Ginsburg's adherence to measured motions, one might view her changed tone as an expression 
of distinct disagreement with the trajectory of the Court. Ginsburg has indicated that she has no 
~ 
current plans to retire and wil~kely to continue to voice opposition if her prediction about 
judicial activism comes true. No stranger to adversity, this may be Ginsburg's last public battle 
before retiring. 
This paper will explore Ginsburg's rise to Supreme Court Justice and evaluate if she has 
adhered to her jurisprudential approach since being appointed to the Court. Part I explores 
Ginsburg's early life, career as a litigator, and transition into a Judge. Part II examines 
Ginsburg's jurisprudential approach. Part III evaluates landmark opinions authored by Ginsburg 
and explores if she has remained true to her hallmark jurisprudential approach. 
I. Justice Ginsburg's Early Life and Career 
Joan Ruth Bader1 was born on March 15, 1933 in Brooklyn, New York to Nathan and 
Cecilia Bader. She was their second child and was lovingly nicknamed Kiki? Ginsburg grew up 
1 Despite the fact that Ginsburg is widely to as referred Ruth Joan Bader, Confirmation Hearing records 
indicate that her given name is Joan. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rct Cong. 57 (1994) 
[hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] available at 
http://www Joe. gov /Ia w /find/nominations/ ginsburg/hearing.pdf. 
3 
1n the working-class immigrant neighborhood of Flatbush, which was mostly populated by 
Italian, Jewish and Polish families. Her father was of Russian decent and emigrated to the 
United States when he was thirteen years old.3 He was regarded as a gentle man with a sly sense 
of humor, who developed a business manufacturing low-cost furs. 4 Her mother was born in the 
United ~ States and was a strong educational advocate and prolific reader. 5 Ginsburg's older sister, 
Marilyn, tragically passed away from meningitis when Ginsburg was two years old.6 
To Ginsburg, Cecilia passed on the values of independence, education, and drive to make 
the most of her abilities. 7 Cecilia graduated from high school at the age of fifteen but did not 
attend college. 8 Instead, she worked in a garment factory to help finance her brother's college 
education.9 Unbeknownst to many, Cecilia was diagnosed with cervical cancer when Ginsburg 
entered James Madison High School. 10 However, despite being frequently bedridden and in pain, 
Cecilia never ceased in promoting Ginsburg's studies. 11 She ensured that Ginsburg did her 
homework, practiced piano, and she regularly took Ginsburg to the public library. 12 Cecilia 
passed away when Ginsburg was seventeen years old, on the day before Ginsburg's high school 
graduation. 13 Ginsburg was graduating sixth in her class but did not attend the school's Forum 
2 Phil Schatz, Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, FED. 











13 Interview by Brian Lamb with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, C-SPAN, in Wash., D.C. (June 1, 2009) 
[hereinafter Lamb Interview] available at supremecourt.c-span.org/assets/pdf/RBGinsburg.pdf. 
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of Honor because of her loss. 14 Ginsburg recalls that, "[It] was one of the most trying times in 
my life, but I knew that she wanted me to study hard and get good grades and succeed in life, so 
that's what I did." 15 
Ginsburg entered Cornell 1n 1950 and pursued a major in Government. 16 While at 
Cornell, Ginsburg met her future husband, Martin Ginsburg. She recalls that, "he was the first 
boy I ever met who cared that I had a brain."17 Early in their relationship, the couple determined 
that they would become lawyers together. 18 In 1953, Martin graduated from Cornell and began 
his law degree at Harvard Law School, while Ginsburg remained at Cornell to complete her 
senior year. In 1954, Ginsburg graduated from Cornell first in her class. 19 
Approximately halfway through his first year of law school, Martin received a draft 
notice for the United States Army.20 After Ginsburg's Cornell graduation, the pair married and 
Ginsburg deferred her acceptance to Harvard Law School so that she and Martin could move to 
Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he was stationed.21 In 1955, while living in Oklahoma, Ginsburg 
gave birth to their daughter, Jane.22 Their second child, James, was born ten years later.23 In 
1956, after two years of service, the couple returned to Boston to attend law school.24 
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Oyez Project at liT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth bader ginsburg [hereinafter Oyez Project] (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
15 Lamb Interview, supra note 13. 
16 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26. 
17 Interview by Larry Josephson with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Only in America: 350 Years of the American 
Jewish Experience, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://onlyinmnerica.cc/ginsburg.sht1n1. 
18 /d. 
19 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http://www.biography.com/people/ruth-bader-ginsburg-9312041 (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2013). 






Despite the fact that Harvard Law School had started admitting women in 1953, there 
were still relatively few females at the law school.25 In Ginsburg's class of 500 students, only 
nine were women26 and the general assumption was that they were there trolling for husbands.27 
With just two women per section,28 Ginsburg recalls that it often felt as though every eye in the 
class was on her when she answered a question and that it felt as if she was answering on behalf 
of the gender as a whole.29 Moreover, during her time at Harvard, Dean Griswold reportedly 
asked the female students how it felt to take up a limited space in the class that could have gone 
to a deserving male applicant. 30 Ginsburg has since defended Dean Griswold, arguing that he 
was a supporter of admitting women to the law school and that his intention was to learn from 
the women what they anticipated doing with their law degrees? 1 Despite facing challenges in 
the law school because of her gender, Ginsburg persevered with her studies, earning high grades 
and the title of first female on the Harvard Law Review. 32 
During Ginsburg's first year of law school, Martin was diagnosed with advanced 
testicular cancer. 33 To treat the disease, Martin underwent two surgeries and radiation, which 
effectively left him incapacitated for an entire semester.34 Ginsburg responded by assisting him 
with his studies, while completing her own. She attended classes on his behalf and typed his 
25 Gerald Gunther, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Personal, Very Fond Tribute, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 583 
(1998). 
26 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26.; Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TII\1ES (Jul. 7, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07 /12/magazine/12ginsburg-t.html? r=O. 
27 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26. 
28 Bazelon, supra note 26. 
29 Interview by Walter Dellinger with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Duke Law School, in Durham, N.C. (Jan. 31, 
2005) [hereinafter Dellinger Interview] available at http://law.duke.edu/video/great-lives-Iaw-justice-
ruth-bader-ginsburg/. 
30 Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Makers Profile, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, MAKERS, 
http://www.makers.com/ruth-bader-ginsburg [hereinafter Makers Profile] (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
31 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice Ginsburg, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 283, 286 (2013) [hereinafter Greenhouse Conversation]. 
32 Makers Profile, supra note 30. 
33 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26. 
34 /d. 
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papers as he dictated them.35 Martin survived the treatment and graduated in 1958.36 Upon 
graduation, he took a job as a tax lawyer in New York City. 37 To stay together, Ginsburg 
transferred to Columbia Law School where she graduated at the top of her class38 and became the 
first female to serve on both the Columbia Law Review and the Harvard Law Review.39 
During a time where many law firms and judges did not want to hire women, Ginsburg 
faced difficulties securing a job.40 She knew that she had three strikes against her, she was a 
female, she was Jewish and she was a mother.41 She recalls that, "if a door would have been 
open a crack in either of the first two cases, the third one was too much."42 Ginsburg was 
ultimately denied employment by numerous law firms, 43 including Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton and Garrison, with whom she had worked as a summer associate during her second year 
summer.
44 
As an alternative, Ginsburg pursued a clerkship with a federal district judge. Her 
professor at Columbia, Gerald Gunther, was instrumental in securing her a clerkship with Judge 
Edmund L. Palmieri of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
However, this too was an uphill battle. When Gunther proposed Ginsburg as a candidate for the 
clerkship, the Judge was taken aback by the suggestion.45 He questioned how he could hire a 
35 Oyez Project, supra note 14. 
36 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. 
39 Colleen Walsh, Ginsburg Holds Court, HARVARD GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http:l/news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/02/ginsburg-holds-court/. 
40 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Conversation with Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 909, 912 (2013) [hereinafter Colorado Conversation]. 
41 Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Second Woman Justice; Ruth Bader Ginsburg Talks Candidly About A 
Changing Society, ABA J., Oct. 1993, at 40, 41. 
42 /d. 
43 Dellinger Interview, supra note 29. 
44Debra Bruno, Justice Ginsburg Remembers her First Steps in the Law, LAW.COM (Nov. 13, 2007), 
http://www.law.comlisp/article.jsp?id=l194861838591 %20&slretum=20 131102134227. 
45 Gunther, supra note 25, at 584. 
7 
woman, stating that it would look improper when he worked late in his Chambers.46 In order to 
secure the clerkship, Gunther made arrangements for the Judge to release Ginsburg if he found it 
impossible to work with her. 47 With that arrangement in place, Judge Palmieri acquiesced and 
hired her. 
When Ginsburg completed her clerkship in 1961, she returned to Columbia for a two-
year position on the Project on International Procedures. 48 In this capacity she served first as a 
research associate and then as Associate Director.49 During her time on the project, Ginsburg 
undertook a study of Swedish civil procedure and co-authored a book on the topic, requiring her 
to learn Swedish.50 In 1963, Ginsburg was hired as an assistant professor at Rutgers School of 
Law where she taught civil procedure, remedies, and a comparative procedure seminar. 5 1 
In the late 1960's, Ginsburg's work began to shift towards women's rights. The ACLU 
of New Jersey, began receiving complaints from women who were being forced into unpaid 
maternity leaves when their pregnancy was beginning to show and from women who were 
unable to get health insurance benefits for their families. 52 The ACLU of New Jersey 
46 /d. 
47 /d. Justice Ginsburg was also rejected from other clerkships. In 1960, The Dean of Harvard Law 
School, Albert Sachs, proposed Ginsburg as a law clerk to Justice Frankfurter. He did not extend her the 
offer on account that he was not ready to hire a woman. Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Woman in 
the News; Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/15/us/supreme-court-woman-rejected-clerk-chosen-justice-ruth-
joan-bader-ginsburg.html. Ginsburg was also denied a clerkship from Judge Learned Hand, who refused 
to hire her because of his preference to use "salty language." Dahlia Lithwich, Dahlia Lithwich on 
Female Supreme Court Justices, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2009), 
http://mag.newsweek.com/2009/04/10/women-truly-the-fairer-sex.html. 
48 Herma Hill Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (2004). 
49 /d. 
50 Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 391, 397 
(2004). 
51 Kay, supra note 48, at 11. 
52 Interview by Sandy Ogilvy with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, National Archive of Clinical Legal Education, at 
Columbus School of Law, in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Ogilvy Interview] available at 
http:/ /lib .law .cua.edu/nacle/transcripts/ ginsburg.pdf. 
8 
approached Ginsburg for assistance in litigating theses cases.53 Simultaneously, Ginsburg was 
approached by a group of female law students who asked her to teach a course on women and the 
law. 54 Ginsburg accepted both requests and formed a clinic program to assist her work with the 
ACLU.55 Ginsburg volunteered to act as co-counsel in briefing Reed v. Reed, 56 a case being 
heard by the Supreme Court. Reed concerned an equal protection challenge to an Idaho Law that 
gave preference to men over women in administrating a decedent's estate.57 Ginsburg's brief 
was instrumental in convincing the Burger Court that equal protection required that laws 
concerning gender must have a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that 
similarly circumstanced people be treated alike.58 This was the first Supreme Court decision to 
invalidate a law on the basis of gender. 59 
After her success in Reed, Ginsburg co-founded the Women's Rights Project (WRP) with 
the ACLU in 1972.60 The Project's mission was to develop a litigation strategy that promoted 
women's equality through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 As 
director of the WRP, Ginsburg selected gender discrimination cases that challenged the common 
belief that sex-based laws operated benignly in a woman's favor. 62 To Ginsburg, the notion of 
barring women from certain jobs, like jury duty or bartending, was not a protection, but rather a 
barrier for women.63 Accordingly, Ginsburg sought to demonstrate that gender discrimination 
53 /d. 
54 Schatz, supra note 2, at 26.; Ogilvy Interview, supra note 52. 
55 Ogilvy Interview, supra note 52. 
56 404 u.s. 71 (1971). 
57 /d. 
58 /d. at 76. 
59 Schatz, supra note 2, at 27. 
60 /d. 
61 Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and Justice, 14 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 314 (1997). 
62Schatz Profile, supra note 2, at 27. 
63 Interview by Nina Totenberg with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, NOW with Bill Moyers, PBS, (May 3, 2002) 
[hereinafter Totenberg Interview] available at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript116 full.html. 
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affected both genders equally.64 She showed this by selecting strong cases in which the plaintiffs 
were both male and female. 65 Ultimately, the project's goal was to succeed in getting the Court 
to regard gender-based classifications with strict scrutiny. 66 While working with the WRP, 
Ginsburg helped author thirty-four briefs and personally argued six cases before the Supreme 
Court. 67 Out of the six _cases she argued, she won five. 68 
Ginsburg's work is also credited with changing the language of the law by introducing 
the term gender discrimination, in the place of sex discrimination.69 The term emerged while 
Ginsburg was working on a brief that was being submitted to a panel of all male judges. 
Ginsburg's secretary proposed the change, suggesting that "[T]he first association of those men 
with the word 'sex' is not what you are talking about."7° From that point forward, the term 
gender discrimination was used to ward off any distracting associations.71 
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter named Ginsburg to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. Ginsburg has compared appellate judging to teaching law, stating 
that in both occupations, you must teach your position to your colleagues in an effort to have 
64 Schatz, supra note 2, at 27. 
65 Schatz, supra note 2, at 27; Ogilvy Interview, supra note 52. 
66 Ogilvy Interview, supra note 52. 
67 Schatz, supra note 2, at 27. 
68 Makers Profile, supra note 30. Ginsburg won the following cases: Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 
(1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
69 Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court and Vice Versa, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2009), 




them join your opinion. 72 While on the Appeals Court, Ginsburg had a reputation as a swing 
voter, who often sided with her Republican-appointed colleagues than her Democratic ones.73 
In 1993, Ginsburg was nominated by President Bill Clinton to fill the vacancy left by 
Justice Byron White. President Clinton identified three reasons as to why he believed that 
Ginsburg made the ideal candidate. First, because of her reputation as a balanced and fair 
judge.74 Second, because of Ginsburg's accomplishments in the field of gender discrimination as 
a litigator.75 And lastly, because of Ginsburg's perceived ability to be a consensus-builder on the 
Court, as she had demonstrated while on the Court of Appeals.76 Throughout her confirmation 
hearings, Ginsburg made an effort to portray herself as a moderate judge.77 She described her 
judicial approach as "neither liberal nor conservative. Rather it is rooted in the place of the 
judiciary, as judges, in our democratic society."78 Ginsburg was frank throughout the hearings 
but refused to predict how she would rule on hypothetical cases.79 In Ginsburg's view, it would 
be injudicious to do this because it would show disregard for the particular case and demonstrate 
disdain for the judicial process. 80 Ultimately, her refusal to answer hypotheticals did not impair 
72 Greenhouse Conversation, supra note 31, at 300. 
73 Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism and VMI, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S 
L. J. 97, 115 (2001); See Joyce Ann Baugh et. al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994). 
74 The Supreme Court; Transcript of President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. 




77 Baugh et. al., supra note 73, at 7. 
78 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 51. 
79 Schatz, supra note 2, at 27. 
80 /d. 
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her nomination. On August 3, 1993 the Senate confirmed her by a vote of 96-3 after four days of 
hearings. 81 
Today, Ginsburg questions if she would have been nominated to the Court, opining that 
her ACLU connection would likely disqualify her.82 Since being on the Court, Ginsburg has 
survived two cancer diagnoses. In 1999, she was diagnosed with colon cancer and in 2009, with 
pancreatic cancer. 83 Despite the diagnoses, Ginsburg did not miss a day on the bench, even after 
she was forced to undergo chemotherapy and radiation treatments. 84 She heard oral arguments 
less than three weeks after enduring cancer related surgery in 2009.85 Since then, Ginsburg has 
been working out with a personal trainer, acknowledging that she is up to twenty push-ups.86 
Ginsburg recently made headlines when she became the first Supreme Court Justice to officiate a 
same-sex wedding. 87 
II. Justice Ginsburg's Jurisprudential Approach 
A. Collegiality in Decision Making 
Throughout her career, Ginsburg has emphasized the importance of collegial 
relationships between members of the Court, voting blocks, judges of other systems and other 
81 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Affirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easily-affirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-
justice.html; Schatz, supra note 2, at 27. 
82 Steve Benen, It's Amazing Ginsburg is Even on the Bench, WASH. MONTHLY (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:45 
PM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-
animal/2011 08/its amazing ginsburg is even o031893.php. 
83 Adam Liptak, Ginsburg has Surgery for Pancreatic Cancer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009), 
http://www .nytimes.com/2009/02/06/washington/06ginsburg.html? r=O. 
84 !d. 
85 Robert Barnes, Justice Ginsburg Returns to Work, WASH. POST, (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://articles. washingtonpost.com/2009-02-24/news/36781302 1 pancreatic-cancer-justice-ruth-bader-
ginsburg-oral-arguments. 
86 Ann E. Marimow, Personal Trainer Bryant Johnson's Clients Include Two Supreme Court Justices, 
WASH. POST, (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/personal-trainer-bryant-johnsons-
clients-include-two-supreme-court -justices/20 13/03/19/ea884018-86a1-ll e2-98a3-
b3db6b9ac586 story.html. 
87 Justice Ginsburg Officiates at Same-Sex Wedding, Fox NEWS.COM (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www .foxnews.com/politics/20 13/09/01 /justice-ginsburg-officiates-at -same-sex -wedding/. 
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branches of government. Ginsburg believes that when adjudicating cases, judges must put aside 
their own egos and work together for the good of the court88 in order to uphold the public's 
respect in the institution. 89 She describes the Court as the most collegial place that she has ever 
worked90 and while she acknowledges that the Cou11 often shows its fundamental disagreements 
in closely split decisions, Ginsburg maintains that in some terms, the Court's agreement rate is 
actually higher than the disagreement rate. 91 She laments the fact that agreement on the Court 
does not make news, acknowledging that, "agreement is boring. Nobody writes about that. 
Disagreement is interesting. "92 
On the current court, Ginsburg has played a large role in uniting the four liberal justices 
on the Court and is credited with encouraging the liberal block of the Court to speak in unison, 
particularly when writing in dissent. 93 To Ginsburg, dissents are significant because they appeal 
to a future Court to rectify the perceived error in the majority's opinion. 94 Ginsburg also 
recognizes that a unified opinion heightens the public's comprehension of the legal issue.95 
Ginsburg's goal of collegiality is largely demonstrated through her writing. Ginsburg's 
style of opinion writing calls for restraint in form and tone.96 She advises that when writing, 
judges should be sensitive to the convictions of their colleagues, even if that means avoiding 
88 Interview by John Hockenberry with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Takeaway, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 12, 
2013) [hereinafter Hockenberry Interview] available at http://www .thetakeaway.org/story/transcript-
interview- j ustice-tuth-bader -ginsburg/. 
89 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1992) [hereinafter 
Judicial Voice]. 
9
° Colorado Conversation, supra note 40, at 927. 
91 /d. 
92 /d. 
93 Interview by Jeffery Rosen with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, CEO, Nat' I Constitution Ctr., in Phila., Pa. 
(Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Rosen Interview] available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/prograrn!Rulingsa. 
94 Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1, 4 (2010). 
95 Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The Supreme Court's 'Heavyweight,' N.P.R. (Mar. 6, 2013) [hereinafter 
Heavyweight], http://wap.npr.org/news/U .S./173466698. 
96 Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 629, 632 (2003). 
13 
certain arguments, authorities or even certain words.97 She advocates for a writing style that 
does not attack or attribute bad motives to the majority of the Court, and does not insinuate 
incompetence or prejudice. 98 While using strong language may give temporary satisfaction, 
Ginsburg believes that it ultimately harms the relationships of the Justices.99 Despite admitting 
that a dissent can be more fun to write than a majority opinion, Ginsburg advocates for a writing 
style that concentrates on the legal arguments and skips the "distracting denunciations of my 
colleagues."100 
Ginsburg also believes that collegiality is achieved when the Justices write unanimous 
opinions. She warns that overindulgence in separate opinion writing threatens the reputation of 
the judiciary and the respect afforded to Court opinions. 101 By writing separately too frequently, 
the Court fails to act as a collegial body and damages the consistency, clarity, stability and 
predictability of the Court. 102 Notwithstanding, Ginsburg recognizes that unanimity is not 
always attainable. 103 In light of this reality, she acknowledges the value of dissenting and 
concurring opinions when written to express an independent legal argument. 104 Therefore, 
Ginsburg tends to only write separately if she perceives that the majority has reached an 
unnecessarily sweeping result, the majority has disregarded precedent or hasn't given respect to 
another Court or branch of Government. 105 When a separate opinion is warranted, Ginsburg 
97 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1194. 
98 /d. (citing Roscoe Pound, Cacoethe Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795 
(1953)). 
99 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1195. 
100 Totenberg Interview, supra note 63. 
101 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1191. 
102/d. 
103 /d. at 1193. 
104 Kru 6 gman Ray, supra note 9 , at 633. 
105 /d. at 655. 
14 
believes that it should not "generate more heat than light."106 The most effective dissent in the 
eyes of Ginsburg, is one that stands on its own legal footing and highlights the differences, 
without damaging the collegiality of the judicial panel or the public's confidence in the 
judiciary. 107 
B. Measured Motions 
Ginsburg has famously stated that, "[M]easured motions seem to me right, in the main, 
for constitutional as well as common law adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, 
experience teaches, may prove unstable"108 Thus, in Ginsburg's view, judges should exercise 
judicial restraint and act moderately when adjudicating cases. Ginsburg advocates for deciding 
cases narrowly, focusing on the facts of the case and the legal issue in question. Because judges 
play an interdependent role in democracy, they do not shape legal doctrine on their own, but 
rather participate in dialogue with other parts of the government and society at large. 109 When 
crafting legal doctrine, Ginsburg believes that the Courts should follow in, but not lead, the 
changes taking place in society." 11 0 
Ginsburg's aversion for sweeping decisions is evidenced in her critique of the Roe v. 
Wade 111 decision. While Ginsburg agreed with the Court's determination that the Texas abortion 
law was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, she 
believed that the Court erred by going beyond the law in question, to craft their own set of rules 
106 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1194. 
107 /d. 
108 !d. at 1198. 
109 !d. 
110 !d. at 1208. 
111 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15 
pertaining to abortions. 112 To Ginsburg, the Court had taken the issue away from the legislators 
and stepped too far in front of the political process. 113 
Because the Court is an institution that is responsible for its own power, Ginsburg relies 
on stare decisis to act as a restraint from allowing personal judgments to permeate into decision-
making. 114 To Ginsburg, "judges should not discard precedent simply because they later 
conclude it would have been better to have decided the case the other way." 115 Accordingly, 
Ginsburg's opinions tend to clearly identify which progeny of cases she has relied on in coming 
to a conclusion. As a result, Ginsburg tends to write opinions that rely heavily on case precedent 
and focus only on the legal question before the Court. 
This approach to decision making is reminiscent of Ginsburg's incremental litigation 
strategy that she utilized at the ACLU. 116 There, she argued narrow cases that would create 
strong precedent upon which to build, instead of advocating for one sweeping change. 117 Instead 
of asking the Court to find that all differences in treatment based on gender to be unconstitutional, 
Ginsburg focused on each individual law to obtain localized victories. 118 
C. The Constitution as a Living Document 
Ginsburg views the Constitution as a living document that is "belonging to a global 21st 
century, not as fixed forever by 18th- century understandings."119 At the birth of the Constitution, 
many members of society were not included in the Founding Father's definition of "We the 
112 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1199; Rosen Interview, supra note 93. 
113 Judicial Voice, supra note 89, at 1206. 
114 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 197. 
115 /d. 
116 See Heavyweight, supra note 95. 
117 /d. 
118 /d. 
119 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [human]kind: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, CAMBRIDGE L.J., 64(3), 575-592, 585 (2005) [hereinafter A 
Decent Respect]. 
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People," 120 including slaves, women, Native Americans and men who did not own property. 121 
However in Ginsburg's view, equality is at the heart of the Constitution and this ideal is 
advanced through constitutional amendments and judicial interpretation. 122 To Ginsburg, the 
genius of the Constitution is its ability to become increasingly emb~ver time. 123 
Moreover, Ginsburg's view of the living Constitution is furthered by her willingness to 
look to international Constitutions and other sources of international law. She has stated that, 
"[T]he notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States in grappling 
with hard questions has a certain kinship to the view that the U.S Constitution is a document 
essentially frozen in time as of the date of its ratification."124 She applauds younger constitutions 
like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the South African Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights as being more reflective of modem times. 125 Ginsburg 
finds significance in these other documents because "[E]very constitution written since the end 
of World War II includes a provision to the effect that men and women are citizens of equal 
stature. Ours does not." 126 While not binding, Ginsburg views foreign legal materials as 
relevant when confronting novel issues in the law and emphasizes that we can learn from other 
democratic legal systems.127 
III. Significant Judicial Opinions Authored by Justice Ginsburg 
120 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
121 Rosen Interview, supra note 93. 
122/d. 
123 /d. 
124Anne E. Kornblut, Justice Ginsburg Back Value of Foreign Law, N.Y. Tll\1ES (Apr. 2, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/02/politics/02ginsburg.html. 
125 Ginsburg to Egyptians: I Wouldn't Use U.S. Constitution as a Model, Fox NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/06/ginsburg-to-egyptians-wouldnt-use-us-constitution-as-
model/. 
126 Dellinger Interview, supra note 29. 
127A Decent Respect, supra note 119, at 580. 
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A. United States v. Virginia 128 
In 1995, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the sole remaining single-sex public 
institution of higher learning in Virginia. 129 VMI's objective was to create citizen-soldiers who 
would excel in civilian life and military service. 130 To educate the students, VMI utilized the 
adversative method, which "endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and 
impart to them a strong moral code." 131 The United States sued VMI and the State of Virginia 
alleging that their male-only admission policy was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause, after a female student sought admission to the school. 132 The District 
Court ruled in favor of VMI, finding that VMI's male-only educational environment yielded 
substantial benefits and brought diversity to an otherwise entirely coeducational school 
system. 133 The Court of Appeals vacated this judgment and ordered VMI to remedy the violation, 
by either establishing a parallel institution for women, admitting women or abandoning State 
support altogether. 134 
In response, VMI created a parallel program for women, the Virginia Women's Institute 
for Leadership (VWIL). 135 The school was located at Mary Baldwin College and retained VMI's 
mission of creating citizen-soldiers. 136 However, the VWIL program differed from VMI in its 
academic offerings, strategies of education, and financial resources. 137 VMI went back to the 
Court, seeking approval of the new institution. The District Court held that VWIL satisfied the 
128 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
129 /d. at 520. 
130 /d. 
131 /d. 
132 /d. at 523. 
133 /d. at 523-24. 
134 /d. at 525-26. 
135 /d. at 526. 
136 /d. 
137 /d. at 527. 
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constitutional violations. 138 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 139 and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the matter. 
In writing for the majority, Ginsburg made three significant holdings. First, she held that 
in order to defend a gender-based government action, the party must show an exceedingly 
persuasive justification for that action. 140 Next, she found that VMI' s male-only admission 
policy was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 141 Lastly, she held that VWIL was not a 
constitutional cure for the violation. 142 
In addressing the standard of review, Ginsburg presented an overview of the Court's 
jurisprudence governing gender discrimination. She demonstrated that over time, the Court had 
established that it must review gender-based differential treatment under the exceedingly 
persuasive standard. 143 Thus, the defender of the action must show that the classification in 
question serves an important governmental objective and that the means employed are 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 144 Moreover, the justification must 
be genuine and not hypothesized or invented in response to the litigation, or rely on 
generalizations or stereotypes about the differing abilities of males and females. 145 
Ginsburg next rejected the justifications offered by VMI in defense of the single gender 
education program. First, VMI argued that single-sex education yields significant educational 
benefits.146 She rejected that argument largely based on the fact that there was no evidence to 
138 /d. 
139 /d. at 528-29. 
140 /d. at 531. 
141 /d. at 534. 
142 /d. 
143 /d. at 531-33. 
144 /d. at 532-33. 
145 /d. at 533. 
146 /d. at 535. 
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support that the male-only policy was in furtherance of diversity. 147 Secondly, VMI argued that 
the adversative method could not be made available to women without modification. 148 
Ginsburg also rejected this argument, relying on expert testimony that indicated that at least 
some women could meet the standards imposed on men. 149 Moreover, Ginsburg found that the 
notion that the adversative method was not appropriate for women was more of a prediction than 
a fact and was primarily based on gender stereotypes. 150 
In the last phase of the opinion, the Court held that the remedial plan offered by VMI was 
not sufficient. 151 In order to be constitutional, the tendered remedy must be one that places the 
person denied of an opportunity or advantage in the same position they would have been in, had 
the discrimination not occurred. 152 In examining VWll.., the Court found that this program did 
not offer women the same rigorous military training that VMI was famous for. 153 Moreover, the 
student body, faculty and benefits associated with VMI' s prestige were not available to the 
women of vwn... 154 
Ginsburg closed her opinion by noting that the Constitution is a story of the extension of 
rights and protections to people who were once unprotected. 155 Accordingly, by allowing the 
admission of women, who were equally as capable as the male students, VMI would be fulfilling 
a Constitutional goal and assisting in the creation of a more perfect Union. 156 
147 /d. at 536. 
148 /d. at 540. 
149 /d. at 542-43. 
150 /d. 
151 /d. at 553. 
152 /d. at 547. 
153 /d. at 548-49. 
154 /d. at 552-53. 
155 /d. at 557. 
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The VMI case is a significant opinion because it highlights all three of Ginsburg's 
jurisprudential approaches. First, Ginsburg' s preference for moderation is demonstrated by her 
reliance on stare decisis. In opening the opinion, Ginsburg immediately invokes court precedent, 
stating that cases like J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 157 and Mississippi Univ. for Wo1nen v. 
Hogan 158 serve as the "pathmarking decisions"159 that guide her analysis of VMI's actions. She 
outlines a long history of the Court's evolving position on gender discrimination, which 
ultimately led her to the current standard of review employed by the Court, intermediate 
scrutiny. 160 Her reliance on stare decisis is demonstrative of how this principle acts as a bar, that 
prohibits the Justices from letting their own opinions permeate into their opinions. It was noted 
that Ginsburg did not take this opportunity to raise the standard of review for gender 
discrimination cases to strict scrutiny, despite the fact that she had argued for its application 
before this same Court in years prior. 161 By adhering to the structure laid out to her by previous 
Courts, Ginsburg was unable to consider any of her personal experience in determining the 
outcome of the case. Instead, VMI stands for the proposition that a good judge must be able to 
put aside personal opinions on the matter and examine each argument presented to the Court. 162 
Moreover, the VMI decision can be seen in accordance with Ginsburg' s own litigation 
strategy employed at the ACLU. As a litigator, Ginsburg preferred to focus on the specific 
gender discriminatory law at issue, instead of advocating for sweeping change. In deciding the 
case, Ginsburg focused on the precise issue presented in the lawsuit and did not stray from the 
of this question. 
157 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
158 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
159 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531. 
160 /d. at 534. 
161 Toni J. Ellington, et. al. , Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. 
REv. 699,755 (1998). 
162 /d. at 763. 
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Secondly, the tone of the opinion carries significance. While it may have been tempting, 
if not vindicating, to write the opinion in a zestier tone, Ginsburg instead opted to write the 
opinion in a way that made its points effectively, without drawing any attention to the author's 
history or deep understanding of gender discrimination. 163 Throughout, Ginsburg chose to 
address her colleagues with respect. She relegated her discussion of nineteenth century 
justifications for excluding women from education - including harm to their health and 
reproductive capacity to a footnote, instead of ridiculing these now-discredited theories in the 
body of the opinion. 164 She referred only twice to Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter. Once, in a 
footnote where she suggested that, "the dissent sees fire where there is no flame" 165 and again in 
the text of the opinion soliciting his agreement that it was just as probable that many men would 
opt not to be educated in the environment offered by VMI. 166 
Lastly, Ginsburg's view of the Constitution as a living document is evident throughout 
the opinion. Both at the opening and the close of her opinion, she directly referenced the notion 
that the Constitution is an evolving document. She lamented the fact that at the birth of the 
Constitution, women were not afforded the same rights as property owning men and highlighted 
the fact that for many years, gender discrimination was only subject to rational basis review.167 
At the close of her analysis, Ginsburg outright stated that our Constitutional history is the story 
of extending constitutional rights and protections to those who were once excluded. 168 It is 
through this underlying belief in the Constitution that Ginsburg is able to adjudicate the case and 
ensure that the female students were afforded equal protection under the law. 
163 Krugman Ray, supra note 96 at 644. 
164 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 n.9. 
165 /d. at 535 n.8; Krugman Ray, supra note 96 at 643. 
166 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 525. 
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B A . E 169 . nzona v. vans 
In January 1991, a police officer observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-
~ 
way street and pulled him over. 170 When the officer look up Evans in the computer terminal in 
his cruiser, the officer learned that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Evans. 171 
Based on this information, Evans was arrested. 172 While being handcuffed, he dropped a hand 
rolled marijuana cigarette. 173 A subsequent search of his car revealed a bag of marijuana and 
Evans was charged with possession. 174 Shortly thereafter, it was revealed that the warrant on 
which the officer had relied upon to arrest Evans, had been quashed seventeen days prior, but 
because of an error had not been properly reflected in the system. 175 Evans argued that because 
his arrest was based on a nullified warrant, the marijuana seized during the arrest was the fruit of 
an unlawful arrest and should be suppressed. Evans put forth two main arguments to advance 
this. First, he alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the Arizona 
Supreme Court had based its decision entirely on state law. 176 Second, he argued that the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because police, not judicial error, had 
caused his invalid arrest. 177 
The Court's majority disagreed. They held that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case 
and that the exclusionary rule did not warrant suppression of evidence in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment where the erroneous information resulted from clerical errors. 178 To address the 
169 514 U.S. I (1995). 
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jurisdictional argument, the Court found that Michigan v. Long179 guided. There, the Court held 
that, "when a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be 
interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law 
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable 
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believes that the federal 
law required it to do so."180 Thus, because it was not clear on its face that the Arizona Court had 
relied entirely on state law, the majority held that the case was appropriate for Supreme Court 
review. 181 The Court also held that the exclusionary rule existed to deter police misconduct, but 
did not serve to deter court employees. 182 The Court reasoned that applying the rule in this 
fashion, would have no true deterrent effect as court personnel had no stake in the outcome of 
criminal prosecutions. 183 
Ginsburg issued a dissenting opinion that argued that the majority had injudiciously 
disposed of the novel issue of increased computer technology usage in law enforcement. 184 With 
the expanded use of this technology, came benefits, but also the possibilities of inaccuracies due 
to computer malfunction and user error. 185 Ginsburg suggested that as recordkeeping became 
increasingly computerized, it became difficult to see court personnel and police officers as 
compartmentalized actors. 186 Instead, she suggested that the court staff and the officers 
functioned together "to carry out the State's information-gathering objectives." 187 In direct 
opposition to the majority, Ginsburg suggested that applying the exclusionary rule to court clerks 
179 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
180 Evans, 514 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
181 /d. at 10. 
182 /d. at 14. 
183 I d. at 15 . 
184 /d. at 23. 
185 /d. at 26. 
186 /d. at 29. 
187 /d. 
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would "supply a powerful incentive to the State to promote the prompt updating of computer 
records." 188 To effectively make her point, Ginsburg cited to a passage from the Arizona 
Supreme Court opinion, which found that, "[l]t is repugnant to the principles of a free society 
that a person should ever be taken into police custody because of a computer error precipitated 
by government carelessness."189 To Ginsburg, the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should 
be expanded had been determined too quickly, without consideration for the ways in which this 
technology broadly impacted the criminal justice system and constitutional rights. 
Moreover, Ginsburg found that this Court erred in finding the Arizona Supreme Court's 
opinion was rooted in federal law. 190 In fact, Ginsburg went one step further and proposed 
abandoning the Long presumption altogether. 191 To Ginsburg, the Long presumption was an 
"imperfect barometer of state courts' intent" 192 and departed from the traditional notion that 
federal courts are without jurisdiction unless "the contrary appears affirmatively from the 
record." 193 She suggested that it was challenging for state courts to know when their opinion 
triggered the presumption because its application is based on soft requirements, which were 
challenging for the states to self-apply. 194 Accordingly, Ginsburg found that this case was 
improperly before the Court. 195 
The Evans opinion is consistent with Ginsburg's preference for collegiality between her 
fellow Justices and judges of other systems. A significant part of Ginsburg's dissent is rooted in 
her disagreement with the majority's willingness to vacate the judgment of a State Supreme 
188 /d. 
189 !d. at 25. 
190 /d. at 34. 
191 !d. 
192 /d. at 31. 
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Court. Ginsburg's opinion consistently affords respect to the findings made by the Arizona 
Supreme Court and affords the State Court the presumption that it had ruled for its own people, 
under its own Constitution. 196 Ginsburg's opinion is rooted in the notion that State Courts are 
well situated to enforce their citizen's rights and that it was in violation of federalism to intrude 
too deeply into the area traditionally regulated by the State. 197 
Evans also emphasizes Ginsburg's belief that a dissenting opinion should rest on 
independent legal basis. In believing that the majority has misunderstood the law, Ginsburg 
writes to offer a differing view. She focuses on the problems with increasing technology and the 
reality that law enforcement and court personnel are becoming increasingly enmeshed as 
technology develops. She challenges the majority's assumption that there is no incentive to 
court personnel if the evidence was excluded. As aforesaid, Ginsburg also challenges the case 
law that the majority relied upon, suggesting that it be abandoned. However, despite her 
deviation from her colleagues, the opinion lacks any colorful language or accusations at her 
colleagues. Instead, it rested on independent authority and bases of law. 
This case~ also serves as an example of Ginsburg's desire to work in measured 
movements. As a firm believer in gradual change, Ginsburg emphasized that this case 
represented a novel legal issue that would continue to morph as reliance on technology in police 
investigations continued. In a footnote, Ginsburg highlighted that when faced with frontier legal 
issues, the Court can benefit from "periods of percolation," 198 in which the state and federal 
appellate courts, who are better informed to tackle these issues, and can assist in yielding a 
"better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court."199 She issued a strong 
196 ld. at 24. 
197 ld. at 30. 
198 ld. at 23 n.l. 
199 ld. 
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objection to the majority's unnecessary swiftness in resolving an issue that required more 
consideration.200 Relying on the evidence admitted by the Arizona Supreme Court, Ginsburg 
acknowledged that the use of computerized records in law enforcement presented new dangers to 
individual liberties and that the government's increasing reliance on computerized records had 
potential for "Orwellian mischief. "201 While recognizing that computerized records offered new 
benefits, Ginsburg worried that the increased use of technology also presented new problems, not 
yet conceived of by the Court. Consequently, she believed that this novel issue needed more 
time in the lower courts instead of being swiftly decided by the Supreme Court. 
This case also demonstrates that Ginsburg's adherence to the principle of stare decisis is 
not absolute. Ginsburg was not satisfied that the Long presumption accurately spoke to a state 
court's intent and advocated for abandoning the presumption altogether?02 We see that while 
Ginsburg relies heavily on case precedent in coming to conclusions about the law, she does not 
believe that the Court should continue to adhere to doctrines that do not work. To Ginsburg, the 
Long presumption interfered with a state court's ability to adjudicate new issues facing its 
citizens and improperly conferred jurisdiction to the high court.203 Thus, Ginsburg felt that the 
doctrine should be abandoned. 204 
C. Florida v. ].L. 205 
On October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade police 
Department that a young black male standing at a certain bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
200 Krugman Ray, supra note 96, at 659. 
201 Evans, 514 U.S. at 25. 
202 !d. at 32. 
203 !d. at 33. 
204 /d. at 34. 
205 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
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carrying a gun. 206 Responding to the tip, two police officers arrived at the bus stop in 
question.207 Upon arrival, the officers observed three black males?08 There were no firearms in 
sight and the men were not making any unusual movements. 209 One of the men, J.L., was 
wearing a plaid shirt. The officers approached J.L., frisked hin1 and found a gun in his pocket.210 
J.L. moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search.211 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address the issue of whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a 
gun, without more information is sufficient to justify a stop and frisk of that person.212 The State 
of Florida argued that the search had been valid for two reasons. First, the State contended that 
the tip was reliable because the description of the visible attributes of J.L. had proven to be 
accurate.213 Next, Florida argued that stop and frisk jurisprudence should be modified to include 
a firearm exception. 214 This exception would justify a stop and frisk whenever the police 
received a tip about an illegal firearm? 15 In a unanimous decision authored by Ginsburg, the 
Court held that the search had been a violation of J.L.'s Fourth Amendment rights.216 
In rejecting Florida's argument, Ginsburg's opinion opened by stating exactly which 
progeny of cases her decision relied on. Starting with Terry v. Ohio, 217 Ginsburg reiterated the 
Court's position that a Terry stop is warranted only where an officer reasonably concludes that 
there may be criminal activity afoot and that the person in question may be armed and 
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dangerous.218 Ginsburg also relied on Alabama v. White, 219 which placed a limit on Terry stops 
based on anonymous tips, unless further evidence is collected to suggest that the tipster has 
inside know ledge about the suspect. 220 
Next, Ginsburg applied the facts of J.L.'s case to the applicable case law. She rejected 
Florida's argument that the tip was reliable and found that the tip in question did not have any of 
the indicators of reliability that were present in White. 221 She suggested that the mere fact that 
the allegation about the gun happened to be true, did not provide an independent basis for 
suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct. 222 In order to be a valid search, the 
reasonableness of the search must be measured by the information that the officers had before 
they conducted the search, not after.223 In the case at hand, the tip gave the police no basis to 
believe that the tipster had inside information about J .L?24 
Ginsburg next rejected the inclusion of a fire exception to the Terry doctrine on the basis 
that it was too broad. 225 To Ginsburg, this exception would allow people to harass one another 
and "set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by 
placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun."226 More 
than that, Ginsburg feared that this exception would eventually justify the expansion of the 
exception beyond guns to illegal drugs?27 
2 18 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-70 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
219 406 U.S . 325 (1990). 
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In limiting the decision, the majority did not extend this holding to areas in which Fourth 
Amendment privacy is already diminished, such as airports and restricted the holding to 
situations where the officer's authority to make the initial stop was at issue. 228 Notably, 
Ginsburg declined to speculate about how this case might impact a situation where the danger 
predicted in an anonymous tip was so substantial as to justify a search without a showing of 
1. b"l" 229 re 1a 1 1ty. 
Ginsburg's analysis of J.L. is reflective of Ginsburg's preference to issue narrow holdings 
that focus on the facts of the case in question. First, the case limits how anonymous tips are to be 
used by police. Aware of the grave intrusion implicit in a search, Ginsburg refused to allow 
police officers to effectuate searches based on anonymous tips without indicators of reliability. 
· Second, the case is limiting in its refusal to adopt a firearm exception to the Terry doctrine. 
Ginsburg recognized that allowing this expansion would open a Pandora's box, allowing for 
future expansion of this doctrine in way unanticipated and not presented before the Court. She 
surmised that a firearm exception could eventually lead to the inclusions of other inherently 
dangerous objects, such as narcotics or perhaps even other weapons. Lastly, Ginsburg limited 
the holding by refusing to speculate or explain how the holding might influence other dangers 
identified by anonymous tips, such as reports of bombs.230 Ginsburg seems to find a unique 
balance in this opinion. By refusing to allow for sweeping change in the Court's jurisprudence, 
Ginsburg demonstrated her preference to simply adjudicate the case before the Court. However, 
in limiting the holding to the facts of this case, she is cautious not to foreclose future legal 
questions. 
228 /d. at 274. 
229 /d. at 273-74. 
230 /d. at 273. 
30 
Ginsburg's preference for unanimous opinion writing is also demonstrated in this case. 
In writing for the Court, it is interesting to speculate on the types of language or theories of law 
that Ginsburg may have avoided in order to promote unanimity. Moreover, this opinion 
represents Ginsburg's view that collegiality is best achieved when the Court can agree on the 
outcome of the case. Through unanimity, the Court's legitimacy and role in society is preserved 
and predictability in the law is accomplished. 
D. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 231 
In this case, the Court resolved a circuit split as to whether a hostile work environment 
exists if it does not seriously affects a plaintiff's well-being or cause the plaintiff to suffer 
injury.232 Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc. from April 1985 until 
October 1987.233 During her employment, Harris was the recipient of insults and unwanted 
sexual innuendos because of her gender at the hands of Charles Handy, the company's 
President.234 In August 1987, Harris complained to Handy about the conduct.235 He apologized 
for the behavior and promised that it would stop.236 Based on this promise, Harris continued her 
employment, however, within one month, the behavior resumed. 237 Examples of Handy's 
conduct included calling Harris a "dumb ass woman"238 and asking Harris and other female 
employees to get coins out of his front panPpocket.239 He also regularly made sexual innuendos 
231 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
232 !d. at 20. 








about Harris' and other female staff's clothing. 240 In response, Harris quit and sued Forklift 
Systems alleging that Handy had created an abusive work environment because of her gender.241 
The District Court found in Forklift's favor. The Court reasoned that while Handy's 
comments were offensive, they did not rise to a level that could seriously affect Harris' 
psychological well-being.242 The case made its way to the Supreme Court and the majority held 
that Title VII protections can be invoked in hostile work environment cases where there is no 
showing of severe psychological impact because the discriminatory work environment detracts 
from job performance, discourages employees from continuing their employment and keeps 
employees from advancing in their positions?43 Accordingly, the Court held that the District 
Court had used the wrong standard when evaluating Harris' claim.244 
The Court determined that in order to evaluate if a hostile work environment exists, the 
lower courts must utilize a totality of the circumstances test.245 The Court directed the lower 
courts to weigh the frequency of the conduct, the severity of it, whether the conduct is physically 
threatening or humiliating, whether the statement merely an offensive utterance and whether the 
conduct unreasonably interferes with an employees work performance. 246 
Ginsburg authored a short concurring opinion in which she reframed the legal issue of 
hostile work environment cases to whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
condition of employment that members of the other sex are not exposed to.247 She emphasized 
that the inquiry should center dominantly on whether the discriminatory conduct had 
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unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance. 248 In Ginsburg's v1ew, the 
plaintiff only needed to establish that the harassing conduct made it more difficult to co1nplete 
the job in order to prevail. 249 
Stylistically, Ginsburg's concurrence is short and pointed. She demonstrates that her 
view is in harmony with the majority opinion and concurs with the intention of giving additional 
guidance and clarity to the lower courts to determine whether or not a hostile work environment 
exists.25° Consistent with Ginsburg's belief in crafting narrow holdings, this concurrence can be 
seen as an attempt to clarify and focus the majority's totality of the circumstances test. Her 
desire to focus the majority's test is also consistent with Ginsburg's view that separate opinions 
should only be written when the author has an independent viewpoint that has been overlooked 
by the majority. 
While Ginsburg's career was largely focused on establishing gender equality through the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, her personal experience facing gender 
discrimination in the work place is evidenced in this opinion. When Ginsburg faced the legal job 
market, Title VII had not yet been enacted251 and she faced grave discrimination and difficulty 
finding a job because of her gender. With the enactment of Title VII, greater protections were 
afforded to women in the work place. Ginsburg's desire to focus the lower court's inquiry on 
whether or not the harassing conduct makes the job more difficult, is likely indicative of her 
desire to ensure that Title VII is upheld and that the maximum protections of the law are afforded 
to women while on the job. By reframing the legal issue and clarifying the legal standard, 
Ginsburg may have believed she was accomplishing this goal. 
248 !d. 
249 !d. 
250 !d. at 25. 
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E. M.L.B. v S.L.]. 252 
In 1992, M.L.B. and S.L.J. divorced. Pursuant to an agreement, their two children 
remained with S.L.J. and his new wife, J.P.J.253 Approximately one year later, S.L.J. and J.P.J. 
petitioned the Court to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights so that J.P.J. could legally adopt the 
children.254 After a hearing, M.L.B.'s parental rights were terminated and the Court ordered that 
J.P.J., the adopting parent, be named as the mother of the children on their birth certificates.255 
M.L.B. filed a timely appeal but was required to pay fees amounting to $2,352.36, pursuant to a 
Mississippi law that required the appellant to pay for the cost of preparing and transmitting the 
record. 256 Unable to pay the costs, M.L.B. sought to proceed in forma pauperis but the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi denied her request, reasoning that t e this right only existed at the trial 
level. 257 M.L.B. appealed, arguing that since she was utilizing the Courts to secure a 
fundamental right, fairness and equal protection guaranteed both by the State and Federal 
Constitutions demanded that she be afforded the right to appeal even if unable to pay the costs of 
review in advance. 258 
The Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional. In writing for the majority, 
Ginsburg opened the opinion by recognizing that "[C]ourts have confronted, in diverse settings, 
the age old problem of providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike?59 
She also acknowledged that choices about marriage, family and rearing children are fundamental 
252 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
253 I d. at 1 07. 
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rights warranting Fourteenth Amendment protection. 260 In striking down the law, Ginsburg 
found Griffin v. Illinois261 to be particularly salient. In Griffin, the Court struck down an Illinois 
law that effectively conditioned criminal conviction appeals on the defendant's ability to procure 
a transcript of the trial proceedings as violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.262 Ginsburg also cited to Mayer v. City of Chicago, 263 which 
expanded the Griffin principle to petty offenses that did not carry the risk of imprisonment, on 
that basis that these types of convictions also carried serious long-term consequences.264 
Ginsburg then turned to a narrow category of civil cases where the state must provide 
judicial access.265 She cited Boddie v. Connecticut,266 a case where the Court held that the State 
could not deny a divorce to a married couple where they could not pay the court fees. 267 
Ginsburg emphasized that this case had warranted special attention because of the fundamental 
right at stake. 268 
After evaluating several other civil cases, Ginsburg turned to the case at hand. Ginsburg 
acknowledged that the termination of parental rights is a grave civil sanction that permanently 
ended the parental bond to the child. 269 In relying heavily on case law, specifically Mayer, 
Ginsburg determined that~ issues at stake for M.L.B. were substantial270 and carried serious 
consequences similar to those faced by appellants seeking review of petty offense convictions.271 
260 I d. at 116. 
261 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
262 !d. 
263 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
264 !d. at 197. 
265 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113. 
266 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
267 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113. 
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The Court was particularly concerned with the fact that the State had to prove M.L.B.'s 
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. This high level of proof demonstrated the extreme 
consequences inherent in terminating parental rights and signaled to the majority that M.L.B' s 
case was more analogous to the line of cases affording appellate protection in criminal 
convictions, than ordinary civil matters. 272 Thus, the Court found that due process could not be 
halted because of an appellant's inability to pay for the record in advance in a termination 
matter.273 
The Court limited its holding to cases involving the termination of parental rights, noting 
that these actions are "decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic 
relations matters such as divorce, paternity and child custody."274 Because the termination of 
parental rights is a unique de~tion, it cannot be compared to other civil matters modifiable 
by the state.275 Accordingly, the case holding is limited to the issue of procuring transcripts for 
appellate review of termination of parental rights cases. 
In writing for the majority, Ginsburg's principle of collegiality guides. In writing for six 
Justices, she chose a tone that avoided dramatics or emotional rhetoric.276 Her opinion does not 
discuss the significance of the parental bond, the sanctity of the family, or the emotional impact 
of terminating parental rights. Instead, she acknowledged the importance of the right at stake 
and placed it in a distinctly legal context.277 She approached the case mindful of the severity of 
the sanction and in light of court precedent. 278 In using calm language she articulated the values 
272 /d. 
273 /d. at 128. 
274 /d. at 127. 
275 /d. at 127-28. 
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invoked in the case and their serious implications. Again, Ginsburg refers to her dissenters only 
once in the opinion, in a neutral manner to address their concerns.279 
M.L.B. is also reflective of Ginsburg's desire to decide only the case in front of her and 
avoid sweeping judgments. In the opinion, she is cautious to limit the holding of the case to 
extend only to cases involving the termination of parental rights.280 She clearly establishes that 
termination decrees are dissimilar to other civil maters because of the invocation of the 
"awesome authority of the State"281 to abolish all legal recognition of the parental relationship.282 
Accordingly, M.L.B. does not have a wide application in civil matters. Moreover, Ginsburg' s 
respect for stare decisis is evidenced in this decision. The decision is largely rooted in applying a 
wide range of case precedent to the facts of M.L.B's case. Accordingly, Ginsburg was confined 
to previous case law, instead of allowing any personal judgments that she may have had to enter 
the decision. 
Additionally, this decision is rooted in Ginsburg's belief that the Constitution is based on 
the promotion of equality. While no provision of the Constitution requires that judicial access 
must be afforded to litigants, Ginsburg likely sees this position as imbedded in the Constitution's 
promotion of equality. At the start of her opinion, Ginsburg acknowledged that the Court 
regularly grappled with the issue of providing equal access to the judiciary. Extending M.L.B's 
rights to appeal is a fitting example of Ginsburg's belief that the Constitution's goal is to protect 
those who may be disenfranchised and that this purpose is furthered through judicial 
interpretation. 
279 /d. at 127. 
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F. Grutter v. Bollinger283 
Barbara Grutter, a white student from Michigan, filed a lawsuit against the University of 
Michigan Law School after they denied her admission.284 Grutter had a 3.8 grade point average 
and had scored 161 on the Law School Admission Test. 285 She alleged that the School had 
discriminated against her on the basis of her race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. §1981.286 Specifically, Grutter claimed 
that she had been denied admission because the Law School had used race as a predominant 
factor in their selection process.287 This allowed applicants in certain minority groups a greater 
chance of admission than similarly situated students from disfavored racial groups. 288 
Additionally, she argued that the School had no compelling interest to justify the use of race in 
the admission process. 289 
In response, the Law School argued that it had a compelling interest in enrolling a critical 
mass of minority students to the school and that its policy sought to achieve student body 
diversity in compliance with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 290 The Law School maintained 
that its program was narrowly tailored and considered "race or ethnicity only as a plus in a 
particular applicant's file, without insulat[ing] that individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for all available seats."291 
283 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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The Court held that the School had narrowly tailored their use of race in the admissions 
process to further their goal of obtaining the benefits that come from a diverse student body. The 
Court found that the admission program advanced by the School was flexible enough to ensure 
that every applicant was evaluated as an individual, without having race or ethnicity as a defining 
feature of the application.292 The Court was satisfied that the School continued to engage in an 
-~ 
individualistic and holistic review of each applicant's file and gave serious consi~ the 
various ways that the applicant could contribute to the educational environment. 293 
Accordingly, the Court held that the School's actions were not in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1981.294 
Near the close of the opinion, the majority stated that affirmative action programs would 
soon no longer be needed to ensure a crucial mass in institutions of higher learning. 295 The Court 
highlighted that over the twenty-five years since the Court first approved the use of race to 
further the goal of obtaining a diverse student body, minority applicants' test scores and grades 
had increased.296 The Court believed that this was indicative "that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."297 
Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in response to the majority's expectation that race 
conscious programs at the university level would be eliminated in twenty-five years. 298 
Ginsburg conceded that race-conscious programs must have a logical end point but suggested 
that this point was not appropriate until the objective for which the programs were instituted had 
292 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37. 
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been achieved.299 She supported this proposition by relying on the International Convention of 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention of the Elimination of 
All of Forms of Discrimination against Women, which both proscribe logical end points for 
I 
programs created to protect certain racial groups. 300 
Ginsburg argued that in the time since Bakke, conscious and unconscious racial bias still 
pervaded society. 301 She argued that, "[l]t was only 25 years before Bakke that this Court 
declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a declaration that after prolonged resistance, 
yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries of slavery."302 
Relying on data from public schools, Ginsburg argued that students continued to attend largely 
non-diverse schools. 303 She also demonstrated that schools located in minority communities 
continued to lag behind other schools. 304 Ginsburg concluded that so long as these inequalities 
persisted, affirmative action programs would continue to be needed. She concluded by stating, 
"[F]rom today' s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next 
generations' span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make 
it safe to sunset affirmative action."305 
Ginsburg's concurrence is rooted in the understanding that so long as social injustices 
continue to exist in our society, the goal of constitutional interpretation must be geared towards 
ensuring equal opportunities for all races and ethnicities. However, Ginsburg seems to alter the 
299 ld. 
300 Id. (citing Annex to G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Res. Supp. (No. 14), p. 47, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965); Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Res. Supp (No.46), 
p.194, U.N. Doc A/34/46, Art.4(a)(l) (1979)). 
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justification for affirmative action from a focus on diversity, to a focus on societal injustices.306 
To Ginsburg, affirmative action programs need not only be justified by their aspiration to 
achieve diversity, but also as a means of remedying injustices committed against minority 
groups. 307 This belief may stem from Ginsburg's view that the Constitution was not an 
inherently equal doctrine at ratification and the impacts of this are still felt today. Accordingly, 
Ginsburg will continue to support programs that remedy these impacts and promote equality. 
Her reliance on international law is also inherently linked to her view of the Constitution. 
By using international law to support her view, she demonstrated why the Court had erred in 
predicting an end point for affirmative action programs. Her use of international law is a firm 
pronouncement that she is unafraid to look beyond American jurisprudence if other international 
sources of law can help effectuate the Constitution's goal of equality. 
G. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 308 
Lilly Ledbetter was employed as a supervisor at Goodyear Tire & Rubber in Alabama 
from 1979 to 1998.309 During her time there, she worked as an area manger and was one of few 
females in this position? 10 Initially, her compensation was in line with the similarly situated 
men who shared her job, but over time her pay paled in comparison to her male counterparts with 
I J' ~---/ 
equal or less seniority than ~h~r. 311 At her retirement, she was earning $3,727 monthly.312 In 
contrast, the lowest paid male manager earned $4,286 monthly and the highest paid manager, 
306 Shira Galinsky, Returning the Language of Fairness to Equal Protection: Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence in Grutter and Gratz and Beyond, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 357, 
378 (2004). 
307 !d. 
308 550 U.S . 618 (2007). 





who was also male, earned $5,236 monthly. 313 Ledbetter suspected that the difference in pay 
was because of her status as a female and in March 1998, she filed a formal complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that Goodyear had paid her a 
discriminatory low salary.314 
The case was tried by a jury, which found in Ledbetter's favor and awarded her a 
judgment for back pay, damages, counsel fees, and costs. 315 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed, on the basis that her claim was time barred. 316 The Court of Appeals 
held that in order to pursue a Title VII claim, the complaint must be filed 180 days after the 
alleged unlawful employment practice.317 Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that in order to 
pursue her claim, Ledbetter would have had to have filed her claim within 180 days of the day in 
which Goodyear had failed to increase her salary commensurate to her male peers. 318 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and the majority opinion affirmed this holding.319 
Ginsburg dissented and opened her opinion by highlighting the uniqueness of pay 
disparity discrimination cases. Unlike discriminatory acts involving discrete acts, pay disparity 
cases build slowly and over time.320 Ginsburg pointed out the challenges inherent in bringing 
pay disparity suits. She noted that at first, the initial discrepancy may be too small to warrant a 
federal case. 321 Ginsburg also highlighted that most employers keep comparative pay 
information confidential, making it virtually impossible for an employee to know that the 
313 /d. 
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discrimination is occurring. 322 Lastly, she noted that where the discrepancy seems small at first, 
a female employee in a male dominated environment may be "averse to making waves"323 and 
likely will not bring the matter to her superiors. 
Instead, Ginsburg proposed that in the case of pay disparity, the actual payment of the 
discriminatory wage was the unlawful practice. 324 Under this view, each paycheck "infected by 
sex-based discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment practice."325 Ginsburg found that 
this view was "more in tune with the realities of the workplace, and more respectful of Title 
VII's remedial purpose. "326 She asserted that Ledbetter had not been time barred because the 
discrimination continued to renew itself every time Ledbetter was paid. 327 
Ginsburg largely relied on Congressional intent when amending Title VII to demonstrate 
that Congress never intended to "immunize forever discriminatory pay differentials unchallenged 
within 180 days of their adoption. "328 She suggested that the application of the law in this matter 
led to an illogical conclusion since pay disparity claims will only grow over time, especially if 
raises are determined by a percentage of the current salary. 329 Ginsburg also found guidance in 
Title VII's backpay provisions that allow for backpay for a period of up to two years before the 
action is filed?30 She reasoned that since Congress had expressly limited the amount of damages 
to a particular time period, it was indicative that the 180 day time period in question was not 
designed to be a limitation on the conduct that could be considered.331 
322 /d. 
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For more support of her position, Ginsburg looked to the EEOC, the agency responsible 
for enforcing Title VII, to demonstrate that they too had interpreted the Act "to permit employees 
to challenge disparate pay each time it is received." 332 Ginsburg concluded her opinion by 
leaving the ball in Congress' court to remedy the erroneous reading of the statute in the majority 
opinion.333 Shortly after the decision was rendered, Congress amended the Act consistent with 
Ginsburg's opinion and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was the first bill signed by 
President Obama. 334 
Ginsburg's passionate dissent likely stems from the fact that in many ways, she was 
telling her own story. Ginsburg's own experiences as a female in a male dominated field, likely 
fueled her deep understanding of the realities of discrimination in the workplace and why it 
would have been unrealistic for Ledbetter to pursue a claim in the window of time prescribed by 
the majority. In an opinion largely based on the realities of the work place, Ginsburg identified 
the conundrum that a woman in Ledbetter's position faces. If a woman immediately raises 
questions about the pay disparity, she will be seen as making waves335 and the employer will 
simply be able to say that the female employee does not do her job as well as her male 
counterpart?36 If to dispute this allegation, the female employee stays on the job as a means of 
demonstrating her good performance, she will be time barred from filing a suit. 337 When 
Ginsburg was battling gender discrimination after law school, there were no laws on the book to 
protect women in the work place. As in Harris, 338 we see Ginsburg seeking to ensure that the 
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http://www .nytimes.com/2009/0 1/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html? r=O. 
335 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645. 
336 Rosen Interview, supra note 93. 
337 /d. 
338 See supra Part III.D. 
44 
legal protections afforded by Title VII are interpreted in a way that ensures the max1mum 
protection under the law for those who are victims of workplace discrimination. 
In evaluating Ginsburg's other opinions, Ledbetter is unique in that this opinion is not 
directed towards the other members of the court, or even a future court, but rather to Congress 
directly. This case demonstrates Ginsburg's belief that the Court must engage in dialogue with 
the legislature to effectuate change.339 Because Ginsburg's dissent was written for Congress, and 
to a lesser degree, the public at large who elect members of Congress, we see a departure in 
Ginsburg's traditional approach to opinion writing. While Ginsburg relies on some case law to 
demonstrate the majority's misinterpretation of the statute, her decision is primarily focused on 
explaining the realities of the workplace and Congress' intention in enacting the statute. She 
makes an effort to clearly spell out the problem of amassing pay disparity cases with other 
discriminatory acts and goes to great effort to demonstrate how Congress intended the statute to 
be read. Instead of relying primarily,tase precedent, she also relies on Congressional intent and 
the EEOC to strengthen her position and call for action. 
Given Ginsburg's personal connection with Ledbetter's plight, it is not surprising that 
Ginsburg read this dissent from the bench, 340 despite having abstained from this practice for 
many years. 341 Ginsburg has stated that she is very proud of this dissene42 and keeps a framed 
copy of bill, inscribed by President Obama, in her chambers. 343 
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H. Bush v. Gore344 
After the 2000 election, The Florida Division of Elections reported that presidential 
candidate George W. Bush had claimed the lead by 1,784 votes over AI Gore.345 Because of the 
small margin of Bush's victory, an automatic machine recount was conducted pursuant to Florida 
law. 346 After the recount, Bush remained in the lead, but by a diminished margin. 347 In 
accordance with Florida law, Gore sough to have a manual recount in four counties. 348 However 
the Secretary of State declined to waive the statutory imposed November 13, 2000 deadline for 
recount. 349 The Florida Supreme Court stepped in and imposed a manual recount deadline of 
November 26, 2000. 350 On the November 26 deadline, the Secretary of State certified the 
election for Bush?51 Gore contested the election results?52 The action went before the Florida 
Supreme Court, ~o ruled in favor of a manual recount for all the ballots that had been cast, but 
not properly counted because of malfunctioning voting machines.353 Bush filed an emergency 
application for a stay to the Supreme Court of the United States arguing primarily, that the 
manual recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was in violation of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses. 354 
('-t/ ~ecision, the majority held there had been a violation of the Equal Protection 
.,~ Clause. 355 The majority took issue with the lack of set standards to ensure the equal application 
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of the recount and the Court found that this lack of standards had led to an unequal evaluation of 
the ballots.356 The majority was swayed by evidence that the standards applied to the recount 
varied from precinct to precinct and county to county, even where identical types of ballot 
machines were used. 357 Thus, the lack of uniform standards put in place by the Florida Supreme 
Court to discern the intent of the failed ballots violated the Equal Protection Clause. 358 
The Court also held that it was not appropriate to remand the case to the Florida Supreme 
Court to develop a constitutionally sound remedy because it could not conceivably be 
././ 
~;implemented by the December 12, 2000 safe harbor deadline.359 Thus, the holding terminated 
the recount, effectively resulting in Bush assuming the presidency. 
Ginsburg authored a dissent that largely questioned why the Court was refusing to pay 
deference to the Florida Supreme Court on an issue of state law.360 She wrote, "I might join the 
Chief Justice were it my commission to interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida 
court's interpretation of its own State's law does not warrant the conclusions that the justices of 
that court have legislated."361 She suggested that the Court regularly affirmed statutory and 
constitutional interpretations with which it disagrees. 362 Ginsburg emphasized that when the 
Court reviews challenges to administrative law, the Court commonly defers to the agency's 
interpretation of the law so long as their interpretation does not violate an expressed intent of 
Congress. 363 She suggested that "the Constitution does not call upon us to pay more respect to a 
356 I d. at 1 06-07. 
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federal administrative agency's construction of federal law than to a state high court's 
interpretation of its own state's law."364 Moreover, Ginsburg contended that even when this 
Court must examine a state law in order to protect federal rights, the Court has done so in a 
manner that affords respect to the interpretations of state law by the State's highest court.365 
Ginsburg further demonstrated the Court's esteem of state court's expertise by reminding the 
majority that the Court frequently used the certification devise, a process by which a state high 
court informs the Supreme Court on matters of local law. 366 
Ginsburg argued that contrary to the majority's assertion, this Court rarely outright 
rejected a state court's interpretation of its law?67 She criticized the choice of cases that the 
Chief Justice invoked to suggest that this practice was commonplace. 368 Instead, she argued that 
the cases that the Chief Justice relied upon were rare, embedded in historical context, and 
dissimilar to the current case.369 Notably, Ginsburg highlighted that two of the aforementioned 
cases discussed overturning laws enacted during the Civil Rights era, where the state had used 
law to harm its citizens.370 Ginsburg suggested that the Court "surely should not be bracketed 
with the state high courts of the Jim Crow South."371 
Additionally, Ginsburg believed that the majority's concern about the safe harbor 
deadline was misplaced, arguing that if the deadline were to pass, Florida would still be entitled 
to deliver its electoral votes?72 Accordingly, she disagreed with the Court's determination that 
an adequate remedy could not be implemented if sent back to the Florida Court. Ginsburg 
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concluded her opinion by stating, "[l]n sum, the Court's conclusions that a constitutionally 
adequate recount is impractical is a prophecy the Court's own judgment will not allowed to be 
tested. Such an untested prophecy should not decid~/the Presidency of the United States."373 
In a dissent uncharacteristic in form and tone, Ginsburg slammed her colleagues for 
overturning a reasoned interpretation of Florida law by members of Florida's High Court. She 
mocked the majority for its decision, reminding the Court that they regularly affirm state 
statutory and constitutional interpretations with which it disagrees. 374 She stopped short of 
accusing her colleagues of hypocrisy 375 and suggested that if her colleagues acted as they 
typically did, in a matter mindful of the system of dual sovereignty, than surely they would 
affirm the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. 376 She was particularly critical of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's attempt to justify the majority position by citing dissimilar case law and 
invoked the Country's racist past to further accentuate her point. 
It was widely noted that Ginsburg ended her decision with the words "I dissent," 377 
omitting the word 'respectfully,' which traditionally separates the two words. It has been 
suggested that her choice to omit the world may have been indicative of her true dissatisfaction 
with the majority's outcome of the case.378 However, others have contended that her omittance 
of the word was a choice made for "economy of style"379 rather than to convey anger. 380 Despite 
the varying opinions on Ginsburg's choice, or lack thereof, of words in concluding her dissent, it 
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is apparent that this case marks a distinct change in the tone of Ginsburg's opinions. The dissent 
challenges the reasoning of her colleagues and attributes bad motives to their opinion. It is a 
preview of the biting tone that Ginsburg is capable of and her ability to use colorful language to 
call into question the intentions her colleagues. 
However, as in Evans, 381 Ginsburg's dissent spoke to theme of collegiality and deference 
to judges of other systems. 382 Ginsburg takes issue with Court's willingness to override the 
expertise of the Florida High Court in the arena of state law. To emphasize this point she 
invokes basic principles of federalism and suggests that the extraordinary nature of this case had 
obscured traditional judicial principles. 383 Thus, despite the tone taken with her colleagues, Bush 
adheres to Ginsburg's view that collegiality and respect runs to judges of other systems. 
Ginsburg has been vocal about her role as a consensus builder among the liberal Justices 
of the Court and often makes efforts to work with her colleagues to come together to write 
unified opinions. 384 However, the split decisions that emerged from Bush demonstrate that 
cohesive opinions are not always attainable. Ginsburg has acknowledged that the American 
people struggled to understand the case's outcome because of the Court's splintered opinions.385 
She has since explained that due to the timing of the case, there was no time for the Court to 
come together to form a unified opinion because the Court agreed to hear the case on a Saturday 
and rendered their decision on that following Tuesday.386 Perhaps with more time, the public 
would have received a more unified opinion, which would have achieved Ginsburg's goal of 
promoting stability and predictability in the Court. 
381 See supra Part III.B. 
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I. Nat'l Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius 387 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) to 
increase access to health insurance and to decrease the cost of healthcare. 388 A key provision 
was the individual mandate, which required most Americans to maintain a minimal amount of 
health insurance coverage. 389 Thus, individuals, who were not receiving health insurance from 
their employer or by other means were required to purchase insurance from a private 
company.390 Starting in 2014, those who did not comply with the mandate would be obligated to 
make a shared responsibility payment to the Federal Government.391 The ACA also expanded 
the scope of Medicaid program funding and increased the number of individuals that the states 
were required to cover. 392 Twenty-six states and a group of private individuals and businesses 
filed a lawsuit against the Health and Human Department Services, Treasury, and Labor 
Departments and their Secretaries challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate and 
the Medicaid expansion. 393 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority and held that the individual mandate 
provision of the ACA was constitutional under the power vested in Congress to lay and collect 
taxes. 394 However, Roberts rejected the argument that the Act was constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 395 The majority also held that the 
Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress' power under the Spending Clause and was thus 
387 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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unconstitutional. 396 Ginsburg concurred with the judgment that the individual mandate was 
constitutional and dissented with the Chief Justice's determination that the Medicaid expansion 
was violative of the Constitution. 
Despite her agreement with the Chief Justice, Ginsburg authored a powerful concurrence 
arguing that the mandate was also constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.397 Ginsburg boldly opened her opinion by stating that the healthcare market 
is one in which every individual invariably participates in.398 In her view, every person in the 
United States will at some point, visit a doctor or healthcare professional. 399 By providing 
medical services to the uninsured, it raises the price of health insurance 400 and in turn, healthcare 
providers pass these costs to the government and private insurance companies, who then shift the 
cost to those purchasing insurance. 401 Thus, the failure to purchase insurance has profound 
impacts on the healthcare market.402 To Ginsburg, the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to 
enact the individual mandate to remedy the economic and social problems caused by the number 
of residents who are unable or unwilling to obtain health insurance.403 
To support her legal footing, Ginsburg's opinion provided a detailed history of the 
Commerce Clause. She asserted that the Court has long viewed the Commerce Clause as 
granting Congress the power to regu~nomic activities that substantially impacted interstate 
commerce. 404 She also asserted that the Court had long afforded Congress respect when it 
396 /d. at 2603-04. 
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enacted economic and sociallegislation405 and accordingly when reviewing legislation, the Court 
must "ask only (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulated 
activity substantially affect interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a reasonable 
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. "406 
To Ginsburg, the application of the aforementioned principles clearly demonstrated that 
Congress had a rational basis in concluding that those without medical insurance substantially 
affected interstate commerce. 407 She identified that the uninsured consumed billions of dollars of 
healthcare products and services annually.408 These goods, Ginsburg argued, are produced, sold, 
and distributed by national and regional companies who regularly transact interstate business.409 
Moreover Ginsburg found that the individual mandate had a reasonable connection to Congress' 
goal of protecting the healthcare market from the problems caused by uninsured individuals.410 
In Ginsburg's view, the Court had abandoned its long-standing precedent regarding the 
Commerce Clause. She lambasted the Chief Justice for his abandonment of commerce clause 
jurisprudence to a pre-Lochner era. 411 Relying on Wickard v. Filbum 412 and Gonzales v. 
Raich, 413 Ginsburg demonstrated that the Court had a long history of recognizing Congress' 
ability to regulate the conduct an individual because of prophesied future activity.414 She also 
rejected the Chief Justice's argument that those who are not purchasing insurance are not active 
405 !d. 
406 Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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in the market by citing to statistics to demonstrate that almost everyone will participate in the 
healthcare market.415 
The bulk of Ginsburg's argument rested on the uniqueness of the health care market. She 
rejected popular arguments comparing the healthcare market to the car market or to a market that 
required the purchase of broccoli. The Chief Justice had proposed that an individual is not 
deemed active in the car market simply because one day he may decideJ to buy a car. Ginsburg 
responded by declaring the analogy inapt416 based on the unpredictable and inevitable need for 
medical care.417 To Ginsburg, although one day you may buy a car, there is no certainty that you 
ever will do so.418 Moreover, if at that that future point, the individual decided that they wanted 
a car or "has a craving for broccoli,"419 the individual would be forced to pay at the counter 
before receiving the goods, unlike in the healthcare market.420 
Ginsburg also dismissed claims that allowing the individual mandate to pass 
constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause would give Congress a carte blanche to enact 
other purchase mandates. 421 Relying on the argument that the healthcare market is unique, 
Ginsburg again turned to the broccoli example and rejected the Chief Justice's suggestion that 
Congress would be authorized to adopt a mandate on eating a healthy diet.422 In a widely cited 
paragraph, Ginsburg stated, 
415 /d. at 2618. 
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[C]onsider the chain of inferences the Court would have to accept 
to conclude that a vegetable-purchase mandate was likely to have 
a substantial effect on the health-care costs borne by lithe 
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forced to buy vegetables would then eat them (instead of throwing 
or giving them away), would prepare the vegetables in a healthy 
way (steamed or raw, not deep-fried), would cut back on 
unhealthy foods, and would not allow other factors (such as lack 
of exercise or little sleep) to trump the improved diet. Such 
"pil[ing of] inference upon inference" is just what the Court 
refused to do in Lopez and Morrison. 423 
To Ginsburg, the uniqueness of the healthcare market generated a unique free-riding problem not 
present in any other market. 424 Because other individual choices would not affect interstate 
commerce in the same way as the healthcare market, Ginsburg rejected the notion that the 
individual mandate would give Congress unbridled power in passing mandates.425 
In arguing that the individual mandate was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Ginsburg reminded the Court that Congress enacted the ACA to stop the industry 
practice of charging higher prices or outright denying coverage to individuals with preexisting 
medial conditions. 426 Because the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to ban this practice, 
Ginsburg argued that the individual mandate provision was reasonably adapted to achieving 
Congress' ultimate goal and thus valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.427 
Ginsburg dissented from the portion of the Chief Justices' opinion that struck down the 
Medicaid penalty provisions. She argued that since Medicaid's implementation, States have 
agreed to amend their Medicaid plans in accordance with Federal law and that States have a long 
history of receiving Medicaid funds contingent on terms set by Congress. 428 Accordingly, 
Ginsburg argued that the expansion was consistent with the Spending Clause. 
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When reading Ginsburg's opinion, it is easy to forget that it is not simply a dissenting 
opinion. In a manner uncharacteristic of her writing, Ginsburg takes a striking tone in attacking 
the Chief Justice's opinion and reasoning. She states that the Chief Justice's opinion suffers 
from "multiple flaws" 429 and that the decision uses inapt analogies. 430 She accuses him of 
writing an argument that is "difficult to fathom" 431 and accepting of "specious logic." 432 
Moreover, she calls his opinion long on rhetoric and short on substance.433 Ginsburg mocks the 
Chief Justice for invoking the healthy-eating mandate and market as a comparative to the 
healthcare market. Her ability to play with these metaphors is an effective tool to cast doubt on 
the reasoning of the Chief Justice and highlights, in a seemingly comedic way, how far the Chief 
Justice has strayed from the Court's jurisprudence. 
There is no question that this opinion represents a departure from Ginsburg's typically 
collegial tone and is likely a reflection of her true disagreement with the Chief Justice's rejection 
of decades of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. More than that, this opinion seems to highlight a 
larger issue that Ginsburg sees emerging on the current Court. In a recent interview, Ginsburg 
stated that she believes the Robert's Court is becoming "one of the most activist courts in 
history." 434 To Ginsburg, activism is measured by the Court's readiness to overturn 
legislation. 435 She has expressed that she is troubled that the Court is not hesitant to overturn 
laws enacted by Congress and cites to this case as a prime example, despite the fact that the 
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individual mandate was saved by the taxing power. 436 Ginsburg has long believed that the 
Judiciary must work together with the other branches of government and defer to Congress when 
appropriate. The notion of an activist court is directly in conflict with Ginsburg's view on the 
role of the judiciary and likely was the impetus for this strong and uncharacteristic opinion. 
Additionally, when this opinion was written, another major change had occurred in the 
Court. For most of Ginsburg's years on the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens was the most senior 
liberal Justice on the bench. In that role, he was in charge of assigning authorship of opinions 
divided on traditional liberal or conservative lines. Often, Stevens would keep many of the high 
profile cases for himself. 437 With his departure, Ginsburg inherited this role and in tum was 
granted the ability to write on her choice of issues.438 It seems as though Ginsburg's new role 
may also have factored into her new voice by granting her the opportunity to write on her choice 
of issues. 
Despite her lack of collegiality towards a fellow Justice, Ginsburg has been vocal about 
the efforts she made to unite the liberals of the Court in this opinion. 439 She placed great 
importance on ensuring that the separate opinion spoke on behalf of all the liberal Justices, out of 
her belief that it would be easier for the public to comprehend one unified opinion.440 Ginsburg 
met with her liberal colleagues for nearly three hours to discuss how the opinion should be 
written and gave her liberal colleagues a draft of the opinion before it was circulated to the rest 
of the Justices. 441 Thus, we see some tension between Ginsburg's long-standing belief in 
collegiality. Certainty, there is no question that she wanted to work with her colleagues to create 







a unified opinion, but the same can not be said about the tone taken with her more conservative 
colleagues, specifically the Chief Justice. 
The tone of Ginsburg's opinion is interconnected with her predilection to work in 
measured motions, instead of sweeping strokes. Another reason she may have been so vocal in 
this opinion is because of her complete disagreement with the Chief Justices' abandonment of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in one fell sweep. Ginsburg rejects these types of far-reaching 
changes and likely purposefully delegated a large portion of her opinion to highlight the Court's 
long-standing jurisprudence on the matter. To Ginsburg, the individual mandate was a rational 
extension of the Commerce Clause, since it was inevitable that the future activity of participating 
in the healthcare market would occur.442 Thus, the more aggressive tone of her opinion is likely 
intertwined with her view that there had been unprecedented broad reform of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, back to the Lochner-era, long abandoned by this Court. 443 
J. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder 444 
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 was enacted in response to entrenched racial 
discrimination in voting in certain parts of the United States.445 Section 4 of the Act designated 
the jurisdictions that were covered by the Act based on their history of implementing barriers to 
minority voters. 446 Section 5 of the Act provided that the aforementioned covered jurisdictions 
could not change their voting procedures without first getting preclearance from the federal 
government. 447 While only implemented as a temporary measure, Congress reauthorized the 
442 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2618. 
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VRA several times.448 Most recently, the Act was reauthorized in 2006 for an additional twenty-
five years.449 Congress did not make any changes to the coverage formula delineated above and 
amended section 5 to prohibit a broader range of conduct.450 
Shelby County, a covered jurisdiction, brought a suit seeking a declaratory judgment 
finding that sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA were facially unconstitutional.451 They also sought a 
permanent injunction against their enforcement.452 The Court granted certiorari and held that 
section 4(b) of the VRA was unconstitutional and could no longer be used as a basis for 
subjecting certain jurisdictions to preclearance. 453 The majority rested its argument on the notion 
that significant progress has been made in eliminating the first generation barriers in voting and 
that since the VRA was enacted, there had been an increase in registered minority voters and 
minority representation in government. 454 The Court held that the coverage formula of section 
4(b) was based on old data that was not representative of the current state of affairs in the 
Country.455 In overturning section 4(b) the majority stated that, "[T]oday the Nation is no longer 
divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were."456 
Ginsburg authored the dissenting opinion in which she largely relied on history and 
deference to Congressional action to support her disagreement with the majority opinion. The 
opinion started with the presumption that voting discrimination is an issue that is alive and 
well. 457 Ginsburg outlined the history leading to the development of the VRA and the 
448 I d. at 2620-21 
449 I d. at 2621. 
450 !d. 
451 !d. at 2621-22. 
452 I d. at 2622. 
453 I d. at 2622, 2631. 
454 !d. at 2625. 
455 !d. at 2629. 
456 !d. at 2627. 
457 !d. at 2633. 
-- ------- ---
59 
mechanisms within it to protect jurisdictions with histories of voting discrimination. 458 She 
distinguished between two types of voter's discrimination: first-generation and second-
generation barriers. First -generation barriers are those that block minority voters from the polls 
in direct ways.459 These barriers are generally experienced through low minority voter turnout 
and low minority representation in government.460 Alternatively, second-generation barriers are 
less obvious methods that seek to eliminate the potency of a minority's vote through mechanisms 
like racial gerrymandering, at large voting systems, and discriminatory annexation.461 Ginsburg 
suggested that the VRA has been successful in reducing first-generation barriers but that the 
Act's continued importance lay in its ability to adapt and protect against emerging second-
generation ones. 462 
When Congress re-authorized the VRA in 2006, extensive evidence and hearings were 
amassed, leading Congress to conclude that the VRA continued to hold significance in light of 
the fact that second-generation barriers continued to block minority voters from full participation 
in the electoral process.463 Accordingly, the VRA was necessary to ensure that minority voters 
were not deprived of their right to vote or to have their votes diluted. 464 Ginsburg argued that 
when reviewing Congressional action, the Court is required to utilize rational basis review.465 
Thus, the Court must only evaluate whether Congress had employed rational means to remedy 
the Constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. 466 Ginsburg found that the 
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Congressional record demonstrated that Congress had properly evaluated the evidence 
supporting reauthorizing met the requirements of the rational basis test. 467 
To illustrate her point, Ginsburg presented a long and thorough evaluation of the 
evidence that Congress relied upon when making its decision to continue the preclearance 
remedy of the VRA.468 She quoted statistics to demonstrate that between 1982 and 2006, the 
Department of Justice had blocked more than 700 voting changes on the basis that they were 
discriminatory.469 She also repeated characteristic examples of blocked proposals, including a 
case out of Dallas County, Alabama, which sought to purge its voter registry of many of its black 
voters.470 These stories sought to illustrate that while first-generation voting discrimination had 
decreased, the discrimination had evolved into second-generation barriers and that the 
jurisdictions that had a "unique history of problems with racial discrimination in voting"471 
required assistance in ensuring that their voting procedures lack discriminatory intent.472 
Ginsburg found further constitutional support for the VRA in its permissive sections, 
which allowed jurisdictions to bail out of coverage after demonstrating compliance with the Act 
for ten years and bail into the Act upon an appropriate finding of voter discrimination. 473 
Ginsburg argued that these provisions were effective mechanisms to respond to discrimination 
and demonstrated the VRA's ability to self-regulate and respond to current conditions in the 
Country.474 
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Like the Affordable Care Act Case,475 Ginsburg's dissent is vocal about her disapproval 
of the majority's willingness to overturn an act of Congress. Her opinion deliberately spells out 
the evidence that Congress considered before overwhelmingly re-authorizing the Act to 
demonstrate just how much evidence the majority overlooked in coming to its conclusion. The 
use of the evidence is also a tool that Ginsburg uses to show that the VRA passed constitutional 
muster under rational basis review. She accuses the majority of substituting its judgment for that 
of Congress and abandoning long-standing precedent that dictates that Congress may use any 
rational means to exercise its power in the arena of combating racial discrimination in voting.476 
In Ginsburg's view, the elected officials of Congress have greater insight into how this 
legislation effects. their constituents, than the unelected Justices of the Court.477 For that reason, 
the Court should defer to Congressional action unless the Court finds that Congress has not 
employed rational means for reauthorizing the statute.478 To Ginsburg, it is not the place of the 
Court to step so far in front of the national mood and overturn legislation. 
Ginsburg's tone in the dissenting opinion is also notable for its lack of collegiality and 
fiery attack on the majority. In the opinion, Ginsburg accused the majority of demonstrating 
hubris479 and writing a decision that lacked in sound reasoning. 480 She charged the Court of 
being careless in overlooking much of the evidence presented to Congress, suggesting that 
~- C)J '.' ) • \--
"[O]ne would expect more from an opinion striking at the . ea of,~the Nation's signal piece of 
civil-rights legislation." 481 Moreover, she exposed what she deemed a "sad irony" 482 in the 
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majority's writing for their inability to see the grander context of the VRA's enactment.483 By 
overturning the coverage formula in section 4(b ), Ginsburg stressed that history would repeat 
itself, and that as subtle second-generation barriers emerged, preclearance played a vital role in 
protecting minority voters and preventing backsliding.484 
Ginsburg also used several metaphors to color her op1n1on and draw out the sheer 
hypocrisy of striking down the pre-clearance mechanism. In describing the VRA's importance 
in stopping voter discrimination before it happens, Ginsburg wrote that, "[J]ust as buildings in 
California have a greater need to be earthquake-proofed, places where there is great racial 
polarization in voting have a greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful racial 
discrimination."485 She suggested that abolishing pre-clearance because of its success was a 
backward proposition and stated that, "[T]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is 
continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a 
rainstorm because you are not getting wet. "486 
This lively style of writing is becoming increasingly regular in Ginsburg's dissenting 
opinions and departs from Ginsburg's earlier jurisprudence in which she tended to shy away 
from using the language of her opinion to attack her colleagues. Instead, this decision likely 
speaks to Ginsburg's perceived view of and opposition to judicial activism on the current Court. 
Ginsburg has described the VRA as the worst example of judicial activism and questions a 
judge's ability to overturn acts of Congress without consequence.487 Her strong writing is likely 
a tool to draw attention to this emerging problem and a subtle call to action to change the 
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direction of the Current Court. Thus, if the Court continues down this path, we can anticipate 
more decisions in this tone in the future. 
Conclusion 
In the twenty years that Ginsburg has been a Supreme Court Justice, she has 
demonstrated consistent adherence to two of her jurisprudential philosophies. Ginsburg 
continues to advocate for nanow holdings that do not make bold changes in the law, but rather 
contribute to the body of precedent developed by this Court. She is typically unwilling to 
effectuate holdings that will have a broader impact than the facts immediate! y before the Court, 
believing that substantive change should come from the elected branches of government. 
Moreover, Ginsburg's outlook that the Constitution is a living document drives her view that it 
should be interpreted to promote equality and become increasingly embracive over time. 
Significantly, Ginsburg's preference towards collegiality has been in flux in recent years. 
Early in her career, Ginsburg advocated for collegiality amongst her colleagues on the bench. 
She achieved this by authoring opinions that demonstrated restraint in tone. Ginsburg wrote in a 
style that focused on the legal theory and the case at hand and avoided writing fiery opinions that 
attacked or ridiculed her colleagues. However, in recent years, we are seeing a change in the 
tone in Ginsburg's opinions. Starting with Bush, but ultimately culminating in the last two terms, 
Ginsburg's writing style has dramatically changed. She is increasingly willing to attack her 
colleagues when she believes that they are in the wrong and has began writing in a bold tone that 
emits emotion and disdain for her colleagues. 
Two simultaneous events have likely fueled this change, Ginsburg's role as the most 
senior liberal Justice on the bench and her view that judicial activism is on the rise on the 
Supreme Court. The first factor has given Ginsburg the freedom to decide which opinions she 
wants to author. However, the second factor is likely the primary force behind his change. Since 
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the most recent term ended, Ginsburg has given several interviews in which she has cited her 
concern for the newfound trend of judicial activism on the Court. Ginsburg fears that the 
Roberts Court has changed the trajectory of the Court by adopting a stance that is increasingly 
willing to overturn Congressional Acts. Ginsburg has cited to Fed 'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 
and Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder as the primary cases that demonstrate this trend. It is thus not 
surprising, that when writing separately in both cases, Ginsburg authored two of her boldest, 
liveliest and aggressive opinions, using colorful language, sarcasm and metaphors to highlight 
the errors in the majority's reasoning. 
Her changed tone may be representative of her frustration with her colleagues and the 
direction of the Court. Or, she may also be using strong language as a means of attracting the 
public's attention to her growing concern in an effort to curb the behavior. With this new trend 
underway, it remains unknown if this tone is here to stay. However, Ginsburg's career has 
demonstrated that when she is faced with adversity, she fights. As Ginsburg prepares to battle 
judicial activism on the Court, one can not help but wonder if her new found voice will be the 
weapon that she uses to counteract this trend. 
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